The unifying theme of my work is that social judgments are often made intuitively and automatically, and justified using more logical, deliberative reasoning. I’ve examined such processes in two principal domains: moral judgments and social stereotyping.
Moral judgments
Much of my recent work examines moral judgments of companies faced with a reputational crisis. One series of studies shows unethical corporate behavior contaminates judgments that should be logically unrelated (Uhlmann, Newman, Brescoll, Galinsky, & Diermeier, 2010). For instance, when a company is accused of sexual harassment and handles the crisis poorly, consumers (unconsciously) perceive the taste of its water as less pure. Such moral contagion is mediated by negative emotions such as disgust. Related research examines trust repair during a corporate crisis (Uhlmann, Tannenbaum et al., 2010), and seeks to understand moral outrage over corporate perks (Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2010).
My work on Implicit Puritanism demonstrates the automatic responses of contemporary Americans reflect our heritage as a Puritan-Protestant nation (Uhlmann, Poehlman, & Bargh, 2009, 2010). For example, consistent with the traditional Protestant link between work and divine salvation, nonconsciously priming words related to salvation leads Americans (but not Canadians, Germans, or Italians) to work harder on a subsequent assigned task. Also, priming traditional Puritan values leads bicultural Asian-Americans to reject revealing clothing and sexually charged music, but only when their American identity is first made salient. Similarly, priming Puritan values leads Americans, but not Canadians, to avoid conspicuous consumption.
Social stereotyping
My second line of research examines the influence of cultural stereotypes on social judgments. One series of studies demonstrate people change the qualifications important for the job in favor of male applicants for stereotypical male jobs (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). For example, if a male applicant for the job of police chief has a formal education, a formal education is rated as important for the job. But if he lacks a formal education, its importance is downplayed. No such favoritism is exhibited toward female applicants for police chief. Encouragingly, when evaluators decide the qualifications important for a job before they know the gender of the applicant (reducing the ability to rationalize discrimination), male and female applicants are equally likely to be hired.
Other recent work demonstrates women who express anger in the workplace are perceived as less deserving of a high status job and given a lower salary (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). While female targets’ emotional reactions are attributed to internal characteristics (e.g., “She is an angry person”) men's emotional reactions are attributed to external circumstances (e.g., “The situation was very frustrating”). Providing a situational explanation for why the person is angry eliminates the backlash against women who express anger.
These findings indicate our judgments are not always the logical and objective assessments we believe they are. Human beings are unaware of many of the influences on our judgments, and our reasoning is biased by a desire to reach conclusions we hold dear. My future research will endeavor to shed additional light on the psychological underpinnings of corporate social reputation, implicit influence of American culture, and effects of cultural stereotypes on social judgments.
Uhlmann, E.L., & Cohen, G.L. (2005). Constructed criteria: Redefining merit to justify discrimination. Psychological Science, 16, 474-480. Download
Uhlmann, E.L., Poehlman, T.A., & Bargh, J.A. (2009). American moral exceptionalism. In J.T. Jost, A.C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.) Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification. (pp. 27-52). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Download